Why Was The Anglo German Naval Agreement Important
Although all governments of the Weimar Republic violated Part V of Versailles, the Nazi government had become more open and open when it came to violating Part V in 1933 and 1934. In 1933, the Germans began building their first submarines since World War I and launched their first submarines in April 1935.  On April 25, 1935, the British naval attaché in Germany, Captain Gerard Muirhead-Gould, was officially informed by Captain Leopold Bürkner of the Reichsmarine that Germany had landed twelve 250-ton submarines.  On April 29, 1935, Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon informed the British House of Commons that Germany was now building submarines.  On May 2, 1935, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald informed the House of Representatives that his government wanted to conclude a naval pact to regulate the future growth of the German navy.  8 The idea that submarines were primarily a defensive weapon was entirely consistent with British naval doctrine. For the position of the Japanese side, see «Report on preliminary naval discussions with the Japanese delegation on 27 October 1934», in: Documents on British Foreign policy («DBFP»), 2nd ser., vol. 13, 37, Memorandum of the Naval Commission («NCM»), (35) 22.111 See Dönitz`s plan to suppress the German surface fleet in favour of the submarine arm. Approved by Hitler on February 2, 1943, in C.
Bekker, Hitler`s naval war (London, 1974), ca. 9. These are the technical objections raised by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. This means an arms race between Germany and France and also between Germany and Soviet Russia, because the latter will not allow the Baltic states to be under German domination for long. An important sign was the inclusion of naval equipment in the orders that French`industry recently received from the Soviet government. Perhaps this competition was inevitable. But it would have taken on a different aspect if the British and French navies had maintained their unity against Germany, if the British Admiralty had not put itself in a position of complicity and close agreement with the German Admiralty that hinders the development of the French navy, in short, if Article 2 (C) had not been included in the agreement of 18 June. .